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Abstract
As one of the most fundamental problems in open-membership systems, Sybil attack has attracted wide attentions from
both industrial and academic fields. Many anonymous communication and censorship-resistant systems have incorporated 
Sybil defense in their designs based on social networks. This paper proposed two-class undirected mixed membership
stochastic blockmodels Different from existing algorithms, our 
model discriminates Sybil nodes by simulating the generative process of social networks. And we gave a matrix B to
describe the interaction probability of Sybil and honest nodes, which can be used to observe contaminated situation of the
network. The effectiveness of the algorithm is validated by experiments over both simulated and real-world social networks. 
The method can be also used to further improve the accessibility of anonymous and anti-censorship systems.
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1. Introduction
Sybil attack [1] is one of the most challenging and fundamental problems in open-membership systems. By 
as voting schemes for email spam [2], data replication in DHT [3]. For example, in user-generated content sites
such as Youku, Youtube and Zhihu, the attacker can register many identities and collude to manipulate the
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ing. Other kinds of Sybil attacks have also been observed in 
peer-to-peer systems like Maze [4] [5] and eMule [6]. 
Recently, Sybil attack, due to its significant impact on system accessibility, has aroused wide attention in the 
design of anonymous and censorship-resistant systems. Research work can be classified into the following 
three aspects: (i) Traditional Sybil attacks and defense. By compromising multiple proxies in the anonymous 
communication infrastructure, the attacker can perform selective DoS attack [7], misleading routing attack [8] 
[9] or even information harvest attack [10] [11]. Defense methods of these attacks are highly related to the 
attacks, ranging from DoS probing [12] and collusion detection to client authorization [13], etc. (ii) Sybil 
defense in peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems. In these systems, user relies on each other to relay 
his traffic to the destination. In order to prevent a malicious user from obtaining the entire view of the system, a 
user is allowed to connect to only a few neighbors. And the neighbor relationship between two users can be 
established if they know each other in the real world [10] [14] [15]. (iii) Sybil defense in centralized 
anonymous communication systems. One key challenge in the design of these systems is to distributing proxies 
to each user while avoiding attackers from enumerating them with many Sybil identities. Recently, social 
relationship is  
ability of creating multiple Sybils [16] [17] [18]. For example, in Psiphon [16], new users can make a 
registration and learn proxy addresses only through the invitation by an existing registered user. We can 
leverage the social relationships in these designs to further discover potential Sybils and mitigate Sybil attacks. 
It can be observed that, although the adversary can create arbitrary Sybil identities in the system (by 
connecting to existing Sybils or through the invitation of other Sybils), it cannot establish many social 
connections to honest nodes. Based on the same observation, a variety of Sybil defense schemes [19] [20] [21] 
have been proposed to distinguish Sybil nodes from honest ones. These schemes take the social graph and a 
known honest node as input. They can be viewed as graph partitioning algorithms that divide nodes in a graph 
into two parts: the Sybil region and the honest region. This paper assumes that, both the honest region and 
Sybil region in the network is fast mixing. We leverage the idea in community detection field to detect the 
Sybil nodes. We used a probability graph model named Two-class undirected mixed member stochastic  
Blockmodels to detect the Sybil nodes through simulate the generative process of a social network. In our 
model every nodes are belonging to both Sybil and honest group with different probabilities. Nodes in different 
group (Sybil and honest nodes) have different interaction probabilities; we used a matrix B to describe these 
probabilities. Finally our model used observed edges between all nodes to infer the probability of Sybil for each 
node and interaction probabilities matrix B. 
2. Two-class undirected mixed member stochastic  Blockmodels Algorithm in Sybil discovery 
 In this section we describe our model named two-class undirected mixed member stochastic  Blockmodels. 
In our model, we assume that the observed network can be described as a graph G=(N,Y), where    
represents whether there is an edge between node p and q. Our goal is to calculate the probability of Sybil for 
each node and estimate the probability of having a link between honest and Sybil nodes. 
2.1. Problem statement and notation illustration 
As show in figure 1(a) we assume that although an attacker can create arbitrary Sybil identities in social 
networks, he or she cannot establish an arbitrarily large number of social connections to non-Sybil nodes. As a 
result, Sybil nodes tend to be poorly connected to the rest of the network, compared to the non-Sybil nodes. 
Sybil defence schemes leverage this observation to identify Sybils. We detect Sybil nodes from the limited 
capacity of Sybils to establish social links.  
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Fig. 1. (a) Sybil attack based on social network; (b) Graphical model representation of Probabilistic Block-model. 
The notations used in the following passages and its illustrations are showed in table 1. 
Table 1. Notation and illustration 
Notation Illustration 
 Beta prior denote global distribution of Sybil and honest node 
B Bernoulli rate matrix denote interaction probabilities 
 Per node probability of becoming a Sybil 
 
 
 
 
 
Whether a node is a Sybil or not in one sampling 
Whether there is an edge between node p and node q 
Variational prior of parameter  
Variational prior of parameter  z 
Sparsity parameter denote the sparsity of  edges 
2.2. Two-class undirected mixed member stochastic Blockmodels 
Two-class undirected mixed member stochastic Blockmodels(we will call it Blockmodels for short in the 
following passages) is a generative probability graph model for a network graph. Different from other models, 
we do not discriminate which nodes are Sybil nodes directly; instead we simulate the network generative 
process. We assume there are two latent groups exist, and the observed network is generated according to 
distributions of group-membership for each node and a matrix of group-group interaction strength. The 
distribution of each node is specified by latent simplicial vectors. Each node is associated with a randomly 
drawn vector  for node i, where  denotes the probability of node i belonging to group k. That is each node 
is belonging to both two groups with different probabilities. The probabilities of interactions between different 
groups are defined by a matrix of Bernoulli rates , where B(g,h) represents the probability of having a 
link between a node from group g and group h. 
 
The complete generative process for a graph  is as follows:  
 For each node  
--Draw a 2 dimensional mixed membership vector  
 For each pair of nodes  
--Draw membership indicator  
--Draw membership indicator  
--Sample the value of their interaction  
 
Attack edges  
H
onest nodes 
Sybil nodes
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The Blockmodels is represented as a probabilistic graphical model in Figure 1(b). As the figure makes clear, 
there are three levels to the Blockmodels representation. The parameters  and  are global level parameters, 
assumed to be sampled once in the process of generating a network. The variables  are node-level variables, 
sampled once per node. Finally, the variables  and are edge-level variables and are sampled once for 
each edge in the network graph. 
3. Inference and Parameter Estimation  
We have described the Blockmodels and illustrated its generative process in the above. In this section, we 
turn our attentions to procedures for inference and parameter estimation under Blockmodels. As a result, we 
will firstly calculate per-node probability of Sybil and per-pair roles through posterior inference and then obtain 
Beta parameter  and Bernoulli rate matrix B through parameter estimate. 
3.1. Posterior Inference 
The posterior inference problem is to compute the posterior distribution of the latent variables given a 
collection of observations. According to probabilistic graphical model show in figure 1, we can obtain the joint 
probability of the edges Y and latent variables in Probabilistic Block-model as show in formulation (1) 
                      (1) 
    The posterior probability can be obtained by computing the integral for latent variables in function (1). 
    
As this formulation is too complicated, a closed form solution does not exist. We used variational EM to 
give an approximate estimate of the parameters. We begin by bounding the log of the marginal probability of 
 
                                         (2) 
And then we assumed that latent variables q depends on a set of free parameters (as show in figure 2). We 
specify q as the mean-field fully-factorized family. 
 
where  is a Beta,  is a Bornoulli, { } are the set of free variational parameters that are 
optimized to tighten the bound. 
 
Fig. 2. (a) Graphical model representation of Probabilistic Block-model; (b) Graphical model representation of the variational distribution 
used to approximate the posterior in Probabilistic Block-model. 
By minimizing the KL divergence between q and the true posterior, we can tighten the bound with respect to 
the variational parameters. And then we get the updates for variational parameters: 
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for g,h = 1,2. Where , and  is derivation of log-gamma function. The 
update for the variational Beta parameters  is 
 
3.2. Parameter estimate 
We used a virational expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to calculate hyper-parameters { } of the 
model. Maximize the lower bound in formulation (2) we can obtain a local optimum solution of { }. 
A closed form solution is not exit; we use Newton-Raphson method to achieve an approximate solution. 
 
 
 
 
The approximate MLE of B is  
 
 
 
Finally, the approximate MLE of the sparsity parameter  is 
 
 
4. Experiments and Results  
We presented a study of both simulated data and real-world data to validate our algorithms. The simulated 
data experiment is showed in part 4.1 and real-world data experiment is showed in part 4.2. 
4.1. Experiments on simulated data 
We generate the simulated data in the following steps: 
(1) Build a graph of nodes and  edges, with Barab´asi Albert graphs of N = 128 and 0m  = 8. 
(2) Make a copy and graph  as (with nodes  =  and edges  ) 
(3) Select random edges   and  from   and  respectively; Delete   and 
; Add edges  and  to the Graph 
(4) Repeat (3) for 7 times to get G.  
The simulated data shows in figure 3 (a). 
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Fig. 3. (a) The synthetic network used in section 4.1 for discovering Sybil nod; (b) Node connection situation in karate dataset. 
The Classification Accuracy of our algorithm on simulated data is 100%. We obtain the interaction 
probability matrix which shows in figure 4(a). We can see that B(1,1)=B(1,2)=0.14, which further verification 
our algorithm. 
4.2. Experiments on real-world data 
We used a real-world dataset (karate) to verify our algorithm. Karate dataset is social network of friendships 
between 34 members of a karate club at a US university in the 1970s which is widely used to testing algorithms. 
We assume one group in the karate dataset is honest users and another group is Sybil nodes. Through our 
algorithm we find some interesting phenomenons. 
As figure 3 (b) shows, all 34 nodes can be divided into two groups. 15 nodes (left) are discovered to be Sybil 
nodes and two nodes (node 3 and node 31, which have equal probability to be honest node and Sybil node) are 
most suspicious node. We should pay more intentions to node 3 and node 31, these two nodes either the most 
dangerous Sybil node which earning trusts from honest users or infected honest users. 
We also can obtain an interaction probability matrix which shows in figure 4(b). Honest nodes tend to  
connected with honest user and Sybil node tend to connected with Sybil node. 
 
Fig. 4. (a) Estimated blockmodel in simulated data, B; (b) Estimated blockmodel in karate data, B. 
Through this model, we can not only parting the Sybil nodes from honest users but also discover the 
network contaminated situation. If the value of parameter B(1,2)=B(2,1) is high, we can say that this network is 
invaded by invaders, otherwise if the value of parameter B(1,2)=B(2,1) is nearly to zero, we can say that the 
network is safety. 
5. Related work 
Avoiding Sybil attack is one of the most fundamental issues in open-membership systems. In practice, Sybil 
attacks have a significant influence on the accessibility of the anonymous communication and anti-censorship 
infrastructures. According to the different Sybil defence methods adopted in these infrastructures, research into 
this area can be divided to two classes: traditional Sybil attack/defence and social network-based Sybil defence. 
As for the social network-based Sybil defence, a variety of Sybil discovery algorithms have been proposed to 
 
Honest users Sybil node
0.27 0.31
0  
0.14 0.14
0
Sybil nodeHonest users
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isolate Sybil nodes from others. The accessibility of these infrastructures can be improved by applying these 
algorithms to mitigate Sybil attack. 
Traditionally, the adversary can compromise multiple proxies in the anonymous communication 
infrastructure to perform attacks like DoS [7], misleading routing [8] [9] or ever information harvest [10] [11]. 
Defense methods of these attacks are highly specified to the implementation of these attacks. For example, [7] 
proposed selective DoS attack over Tor [22] where the adversary controls multiple relays in the Tor network. 
By collusion with each other, these relays can identify connections through them and selectively reject 
connections they cannot compromise. As a result, the chance for the adversary to compromise user anonymity 
is significantly increased. To evade selective DoS attack in Tor, [12] gave an algorithm to detect such attacks. 
In [11], the adversary adopted the idea of Sybil attack and deploys a few malicious middle relays in the Tor 
network. By observing incoming connections to these relays, they found many secret Tor bridges [23] which is 
-resistant design. [13] shows how the impact of this attack can be reduced by 
authorization of connections. 
Recently, social network-based design is cooperated into the design of anonymous communication 
infrastructures with the purpose of avoiding Sybil attacks. In peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems, 
a user can only connect to a few neighbors that they already know in the real world [10] [14] [15]. Every user 
servers as a affic to the destination is transferred through a path in the 
network in a hop-by-hop fashion. Adopting social relations in peer-to-peer anonymous communication design 
can significantly reduce 
times or creating multiple Sybil identities [10]. For example, Freenet [14] adopts the peer-to-peer design and 
through recursive 
other nodes. It also introduced darknet mode in version 0.7, where connection between two peers is allowed 
only if they have prior out-of-band agreement, presumably based on mutual trust in the real life. [10] presented 
the concept of MCON as a communication system that hides the identities of its members from both insider and 
outsider attackers. In order to achieve this goal, MCON adopts peer-to-peer design and get bootstrapped based 
on social relationships between users. And it grows by having existing members invite new nodes based on 
social relationships. Social network plays an important role in the design of peer-to-peer anonymous 
communication systems. 
In the centralized anonymous communication systems, proxies are disseminated to users by a trusted 
distribution center who has a full list of all online proxies in the system. The distribution center has two 
conflicting goals: to disseminate resources widely and to prevent adversaries from enumerating them with 
many Sybil identities. 
incorporated into the design of proxy distribution strategies [16] [17] [18]. For example, in the well-known 
web-based proxy Psiphon [16], new users can make a registration and learn proxy address only through the 
invitation by an existing registered user. The state-of-art distribution for Tor bridges [23] rBridge is proposed in 
[18]. rBridge also employs an introduction-based mechanism to invite new users for the purpose of resisting 
Sybil attacks. 
Incorporating social network in the design of anonymous communication systems also presents us an 
opportunity to discover Sybil identities based on the connections between nodes. Variety of social network-
based Sybil defense algorithms are presented in the past few years [19] [20] [21]. They all aim to distinguish 
Sybil identities from honest ones. Most of them are based on a primary assumption that compared to the honest 
nodes, Sybil nodes tend to be poorly connected to the rest of network. For example, SybilGuard [19] assumes 
the honest part of the network (based on social relationships in the reality) is fast mixing. It also makes the 
assumption that, the adversary may create many Sybils but relatively few connections between these Sybils and 
honest nodes. Most recently, [24] shows the possibility of using community detection algorithms for Sybil 
defense. 
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6. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper we proposed a generative model to solve the problem in Sybil discovery. Different from 
existing models, we do not discriminate which nodes are Sybil nodes directly; instead we simulate the network 
generation process to parting Sybil nodes from honest nodes. Furthermore, we give a matrix B to describe the 
interaction probability between Sybil nodes and honest nodes. The algorithm shows good performance on both 
synthetic and real-world data. In future work, we will try to obtain real connection relations in anonymous 
communication systems, such as the Free net, to further validate two-class undirected mixed member stochastic 
Blockmodels . 
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